This is an introductory, graduate level course in algorithmic game theory aimed at students of computer science, business, and economics. The material is structured in three parts: the first part A) is an introduction to standard game theory, part B) introduces mechanism design, and part C) market design. The discussions in parts B & C comprise advanced topics at the interface of theoretical computer science and economics including auctions (mechanism design) and matching (market design), including questions of computational efficiency, complexity, robustness, and learning.  Motivating examples include web search auctions, wireless spectrum auctions, secure network routing, the “price of anarchy,” IT risk management, and moving target defense.Course goal: ◮ The key concepts of (applied) game theory.◮ The classic problems of auction and market design.◮ The basic skills required to work on new problems in this field.

The course introduces the basis for applied work at the intersection of computer science, economics, and business. Course participants will be encouraged to explore and present own research problems at the end of the course which will ideally evolve into the development of novel questions in the field (and related areas). 

A. Game theory(a) Static games(b) Dynamic games(c) Games of incomplete informationB. Mechanism design(a) Single-object auctions(b) Efficiency vs optimality(c) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism(d) Level-k reasoningC. Market design(a) Matching problems(b) Multi-object auctions

The content of the CBK1 & CBK2 modules is a strict prerequisite.  It is beneficial to have  bachelor-level knowledge of microeconomics.

The successful completion of the CBK1 & CBK2 modules is a strict prerequisite.  It is beneficial to simultaneously attend EC1: Microeconomics.

Textbooks (required reading)Maschler, M., Solan, E., & Zamir, S. (2013) Game theory, 2nded, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.Roughgarden, T. (2016) Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

There will be a two-hour, closed-book final exam, tentatively scheduled one week after the last lecture of this course. This final exam is worth 70% of your grade. There will be some choice on the final exam: In total, you’ll have to answer three questions from a choice of four.The problem sets are worth 30%. Hence, to get a good final grade, you need to perform well on both exam and problem sets.

For the exam you will need to know the full content of the notes and problem sets.

Final written exam 70%Problem sets / report 30%